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Travel
Author: David M. Glantz,Jack Radey
ISBN: 1781590702
Subcategory: Asia
Pages 320 pages
Publisher Pen and Sword; 1st edition (January 19, 2013)
Language English
Category: Travel
Rating: 4.6
Votes: 880
ePUB size: 1417 kb
FB2 size: 1960 kb
DJVU size: 1570 kb
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eBook The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank download

by David M. Glantz,Jack Radey


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Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. Details (if other): Cancel. Thanks for telling us about the problem. The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank. by. Jack Radey, Charles C. Sharp. David M. Glantz (Foreword by).

This new book by Jack Radey and Charles Sharp stands at the forefront of this vitally important process. The Defense of Moscow: the Northern Flank is revisionist history at its best

This new book by Jack Radey and Charles Sharp stands at the forefront of this vitally important process. The Defense of Moscow: the Northern Flank is revisionist history at its best. It describes but a single aspect of the famous battle for Moscow, which, together with Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin, is familiar to even the most casual readers of the histories of the war. This book demolishes myths and legends, replacing them with fresh and accurate insights as to how this battle, long famous as the first defeat suffered by Hitler’s vaunted Wehrmacht, was actually fought and won by the soldiers.

A 'must read' by historian and layman alike. -John Prados, author of Normandy CrucibleNazi Germany's best chance of winning World War II on the Eastern Front came in October 1941. All that stood in Germany's way was a handful of Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades, and militia.

That point was October 1941, when most of the Red Army’s forces before Moscow had . Jack Radey, Charles Sharp.

All that stood in Hitler’s way were a handful of Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades, and hastily assembled militia.

David M. Glantz, author of Kursk. Nazi Germany's best chance of winning World War II on the Eastern Front came in October 1941. -John Prados, author of Normandy Crucible.

The fighting that went on in the 'northern flank' of Moscow would have a direct impact . The main focus of 'The Defense of Moscow' is the immediate aftermath of the beginning of Operation Typhoon.

In either case, the authors have done a service for those interested in the Eastern Front and the Second World War in general.

Foreword by. David Glantz. Stackpole Military History. Charles Sharp, Jack Radey.

The Northern Flank Books related to The Defense of Moscow 1941. The Drive on Moscow, 1941.

by Jack Radey, Charles Sharp. All that stood in Hitler’s way were a handful of Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades, and hastily assembled militia. Books related to The Defense of Moscow 1941.

But the Soviet response, poorly coordinated and depending on makeshift forces scraped together from their shattered armies, drove back the German attack.

There was only one point in the Second World War when Nazi Germany had a chance of winning. That point was October 1941, when most of the Red Army’s forces before Moscow had been smashed or encircled, and no reserves were available to defend the capital. All that stood in Hitler's way were a handful of Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades and hastily assembled militia.According to German accounts, their spearheads were stopped by the mud, but a close examination of German records shows this was not so. Instead it is clear that it was the resistance of the Red Army and bad, arrogant planning that halted the Wehrmacht. This is the dramatic story that Jack Radey and Charles Sharp tell in this compelling study of a previously unknown part of the Battle of Moscow. Using archival records from both sides, they reveal how the Soviets inflicted a stunning defeat on a German plan to encircle six Soviet armies the middle of October 1941.Jack Radey has researched deeply into the history of the Second World War in general and has made a particular study of the conflict on the Eastern Front. He has written many games, articles and film scripts on subjects as wide ranging as the Korsun Pocket, Borodino ’41, American Civil War battlefields, D-Day, Iwo Jima, and Barbarossa.Charles Sharp has a long-standing interest in military history. He spent twenty years in the US Army from the Vietnam War. He served in the army through the end of the Cold War and the first Iraq War, retiring in 1992. Since then he has written fifteen books on the Soviet and German armies in the Second World War, published in the Soviet Order of Battle series, and lectured on military history.
August
While the German Operation Typhoon, intended to capture Moscow in October 1941, has received a good deal of coverage in Second World War literature, the Battle of Kalinin which was an important sub-operation within Typhoon has received scant attention. Researchers Jack Radey and Charles Sharp have corrected this gap in Eastern Front historiography with The Defense of Moscow: The Northern Flank. This book represents a quantum leap in the English language coverage on this aspect of Typhoon and serves to alter entrenched depictions of the Battle of Kalinin as a mere sideshow. Both authors display a superb grasp of the German and Russian source material, which they seamlessly weave together into a very tight and compelling narrative. Although the writing style is a bit wooden at times - causing me to have to re-read some critical passages several times - this is the kind of book that is beloved of history aficionados, full of new information and packed with primary source research and historical documentation from both sides. Overall, The Defense of Moscow: The Northern Flank is a superb addition to any Eastern Front library and highly recommended.

The book consists of ten chronological chapters and begins with the opening phase of Operation Typhoon on 2 October 1941. Wisely, the authors do not belabor the preliminaries and move rapidly toward the main focus on the Battle of Kalinin. Readers should not expect an overview of all of Typhoon and realize that the tighter focus allows for greater detail. By the third chapter, the authors detail the capture of Kalinin by the 1. Panzer-Division on 14 October, which then sets in motion the Soviet counter-response. The narrative has a nice action-reaction angle going for it, with both sides having the initiative at certain points. One very interesting chapter covers the raid by the Soviet 21st Tank Brigade on Kalinin on 17 October, which is usually not even covered by a footnote in other books. Subsequently, the German advance up the Torzhok road and the encirclement of the 1. Panzer-Division - which lost most of its tanks and vehicles - is another example of an episode from Typhoon that often goes unnoticed. The authors have mined memoirs from both sides, particularly Pavel Rotmistrov's, to produce a very revealing portrait of the Battle of Kalinin from each sides' perspective - a rarity in Eastern Front literature. Each day, from 14-24 October is covered in separate sections, in considerable detail.

I was a bit disappointed by the maps, which were often not very helpful for understanding the flow of battle. However, the authors made up for this with a nice selection of photos, detailed foot notes and bibliography, as well as lengthy appendices. The authors conclude that Kalinin was more than a sideshow, but a serious attempt by the Germans to mount a double envelopment to link-up with Heeresgruppe Nord in order to envelope the Northwest Front. That may be true, but this detracts from the idea that the fighting at Kalinin was relevant to the Battle of Moscow - it almost casts it as a separate action. It is clear that the fighting at Kalinin diverted significant German forces away from Moscow, thereby contributing to the failure of Typhoon. The authors conclude with a very useful analytic chapter that sums up the meaning and results of the battle.
Kirizan
You will not have to be an Eastern Front expert, to enjoy The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank, but you will have to have a decided interest in the subject matter. The book is unwaveringly focused on the opening stages of the battle of Moscow on the northern flank. As such, it does not cover, in any meaningful way, fighting immediately in front of Moscow or on the southern flank. It is a fairly balanced account, covering both Soviet and German efforts in and around Kalinin from approximately October 7th to very early November 1941. So, if you are looking for a general history of the Moscow campaign, this is not the book for you. If, however, you enjoy well written, carefully researched operational level history within a specific area, you'll appreciate this. There isn't much about grand strategy, and, while touching on individual actions and personalities, it is not intended to look deeply at the behavior, feelings, and tactics of the individual soldier or his low level unit either. The focus falls right around the corps, division, regimental level of action. Not a lot of lofty prose, but the facts as could best be determined from the limited original sources.

The book consists of approximately 177 pages of text, with 10 maps (5 full page, and 5 covering 1/3rd of a page). In addition, there are approximately 24 pages of end notes, 15 pages of order of battle, and 46 pages of directives, orders and reports. There are 8 pages of photographs, all of which appear germane to the subject. It is understood that good maps from the period are hard to come by. As the writers point out, naming of towns and villages was inconsistent in documentation, maps from the era were very poor, and some locations named in orders have never been accurately located on a map. Acknowledging those problems, I'd like to see more maps, with more details. What they present is solid, but you rarely find a military book with too many maps. A real positive is that the writers direct you to a web-site which includes 1:250,000 scale maps of the area from approximately 1954 (you will want to look at map NO 36-12 if you look at the site. This will give you a much better feel for the terrain.) The end notes are excellent. As with end notes in general, it is annoying to have to flip back and forth (prefer footnotes), but these are worth your time. Unfortunately, the writers had to work out the order of battle with the limited and sometimes contradictory records from 1941. Of necessity, the order of battle constitutes a snapshot in time, but the research is the best available and clearly an effort was made here to get it right. A real gem of the book is the extensive "Directives, Orders and Reports" section. While the documents are of value in themselves, the writers lead you through the implications with comments to each order that remind you of the ground truth as each of the orders was issued. In this way you see the influence of the fog of war, and, seemingly at times, willful disregard of the situation on the ground at higher levels.

The format is conventional and workmanlike, opening with a general breakdown of the situation, proceeding to cover events in chronological order and ending with some summarizing conclusions on the action as a whole. One of the writers' primary aims was to show that the German strategy committed considerable forces to encircling Soviet forces on the Northern flank, as opposed to dedicating those forces to a direct attack on Moscow. In this aim, they succeed. The writers also do a fine job of showing how utterly exhausted the forces of both sides were at this point and how both managed to proceed only by incredible feats of endurance and discipline. Logistics were a nightmare, and particularly tenuous for the Germans, a fact which their high command seemed unwilling to accept. A lack of fuel, in particular, hampering operations is a repeated theme. The writers conclude that this unwillingness to see the reality may, at least in part, have been a reflection of the upper echelon's wishful thinking about logistical constraints that started in the planning phase of Barbarossa and were never adequately addressed. In addition, the command was not willing to give up stereotypes concerning the Red Army's ability and willingness to fight. Kicking in the door of the "rotten structure", as Hitler deemed the Soviet system, proved to be a far more difficult task than those in charge would admit to their soldiers at the front. A result of this arrogance was, in part, this painful set of actions around Kalinin. Very well done piece of historical writing.
6snake6
This is an indepth study of a part of the war that often goes unnoticed.