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eBook Making The Social World download
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Author: John Searle
ISBN: 0199695261
Pages 224 pages
Publisher Oxford University Press (June 24, 2011)
Language English
Category: No category
Rating: 4.7
Votes: 662
ePUB size: 1251 kb
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eBook Making The Social World download

by John Searle


Making the Social World has no doubt been greatly anticipated by Searle's many colleagues and critics, as his project has generated considerable interest. Searle's project should make a significant contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences.

Making the Social World has no doubt been greatly anticipated by Searle's many colleagues and critics, as his project has generated considerable interest. His eighteen books include Mind, Speech Acts, Intentionality and The Construction of Social Reality.

The renowned philosopher John Searle investigates the nature of social reality. How do institutions such as money

The renowned philosopher John Searle investigates the nature of social reality. How do institutions such as money. John Searle is Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.

The paradox he addresses in Making the Social World is that these facts only exist because we think they exist .

The paradox he addresses in Making the Social World is that these facts only exist because we think they exist and yet they have an objective existence.

We make statements about social facts that are completely objective, for example: Barack Obama is President of the United States, the piece of paper in my hand is a twenty-dollar bill, I got married in London, etc. And yet these facts only exist because we think they exist. How is it possible that we can have factual objective knowledge of a reality that is created by subjective opinions?

view of the epistemological status of social ontology seems to be inadequate. Searle’s book does contain some interesting ideas on the contribution of linguis-

view of the epistemological status of social ontology seems to be inadequate. Searle’s book does contain some interesting ideas on the contribution of linguis-. tic communication (by way of declarations) to social structure.

John Rogers Searle (/sɜːrl/; born 31 July 1932) is an American philosopher.

Restructuring Searle’s Making the Social World. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 43, Issue. Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. Quan, Ji Yang, Wenjun Li, Xia Wang, Xianjia and Yang, Jian-Bo 2020. Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 372, Issue.

The Construction of Social Reality. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc. 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, . Printed in the United States of America.

The renowned philosopher John Searle reveals the fundamental nature of social reality. What kinds of things are money, property, governments, nations, marriages, cocktail parties, and football games? Searle explains the key role played by language in the creation, constitution, and maintenance of social reality. We make statements about social facts that are completely objective, for example: Barack Obama is President of the United States, the piece of paper in my hand is a twenty-dollar bill, I got married in London, etc. And yet these facts only exist because we think they exist. How is it possible that we can have factual objective knowledge of a reality that is created by subjective opinions? This is part of a much larger question: How can we give an account of ourselves, with our peculiar human traits D.S. mind, reason, freedom, society - in a world that we know independently consists of mindless, meaningless particles? How can we account for our social and mental existence in a realm of brute physical facts? In answering this question, Searle avoids postulating different realms of being, a mental and a physical, or worse yet, a mental, a physical, and a social. There is just one reality: Searle shows how the human reality fits into that one reality. Mind, language, and civilization are natural products of the basic facts of the physical world described by physics, chemistry and biology. Searle explains how language creates and maintains the elaborate structures of human social institutions. These institutions serve to create and distribute power relations that are pervasive and often invisible. These power relations motivate human actions in a way that provides the glue that holds human civilization together. Searle shows how this account illuminates human rationality, free will, political power, and human rights. Our social world is a world created and maintained by language.
Hatе&love
This book written in 2010 amounts to a reprise of Searle's earlier "The Construction of Social Reality" (1997) which I have also reviewed. In the introduction to this book Searle says there were a few issues not sufficiently clarified and his aim is to clarify them.

The two books are about the same length, but Searle manages to say much more in this one about language, free will, and the sensibility of "human rights" outside formal institutional contexts. How does he manage this feat? In the earlier book he very carefully constructs his primary insight into the structure of social institutions and carefully demonstrates its application to a wide range of social phenomena like cocktail parties, sports, money, and government. In this book, he is able to state that fundamental argument more succinctly (he's had a lot of time to work with it after all), embedding it more firmly into a clarified examination of the nature of human language as it relates to the development of social phenomena. As a result, there is nothing in the first book that isn't also in this second one, but for some readers the main argument, the structure of all social contexts, might be stated a little too quickly here. I had no problem with it, but then I had already read the earlier book.

But despite the extensions and clarifications here, Searle still leaves a few things not clarified. He distinguishes between negative and positive rights. "Free speech" is a negative right because it requires nothing else of others besides letting me speak my mind. By contrast, a right to clean water (a UN declaration says this is a right) is a positive right because it puts an obligation on everyone else in the world to contribute to providing such a right. Searle rightly points out that positive rights are thus more problematic than negative rights, but he does not note that the UN declaration of such positive rights puts the onus of obligation on governments rather than mere individuals. He also uses a strange example, the right (in the context of the social institution of marriage) of a spouse to be consulted by their spouse before the latter commits to some life changing course of action. This is not a negative right as he seems to cast it, but a positive right, the corresponding obligation being on the spouse contemplating the act.

Finally, Searle tries to make sense of the notions of "natural" and "absolute" rights, those that exist by virtue of our being human beings outside any social context. I do not think he clarifies these ideas fully. An unarmed man encountering a hungry lion on the savanna will be eaten by the lion ninety nine times out of a hundred and that puts paid to any such thing as "natural rights" outside social contexts.

Despite getting a little loose with the notion of "human rights" at the end of the book, this is a superb portrait of the ontological structure of social reality. In a last section, Searle points out that most social scientists do not think that a grasp of social ontology really helps them with their work but they are mostly wrong about this. Most social science (for example) begins by assuming language and then asks how social reality is constructed with it. By contrast Searle notes that once you have a language, you already have a significant social context.
Broadraven
John Searle has just written the clearest account of human nature that I know of. This is strictly a work of philosophy, not natural or social science, but it does more than any other account to explain the basic difference between humans and animals. Searle rightly criticizes analytic philosophy in general for "...not treating language as a biological phenomena." Also political and social scientists for taking language for granted. "They all assume that we are language speaking animals and then they are off and running with an account of society..." The point being that it is language that is at the bottom of what makes us different, and that's what needs explaining.

I have read so many accounts of the development of language and human nature, none of them satisfactory. Now I know why. All of them ignore or misunderstand the nature of collective agreement. The main part of Searle's account deals with the nature of collective intentionality and the constitutive role of language in the construction of society. His step by step explanation of intentionality and collective intentionality is superb. It covers the basics and doesn't get bogged down in the usual philosophical hair-splitting, nor, thank God, does he lapse into the show-off technical brilliance but empty-headedness of a Daniel Dennet.

The idea of collective agreement has a bad rap because of a lot of verbal baloney written by the likes of Hegel, Marx, De Chardin et al. Searle does the world a huge favour by showing how collective intentionality has to do with individual minds and collective action. There is no need to postulate a collective mind here. "Collective intentionality, though irreducibly collective, can nevertheless cause the movements of individual bodies." Think of the example of voting. The idea is that everytime that we act to achieve a common goal, we always assume that others are doing the same thing, even if we don't know why they are or what they are thinking. This expectation of others acting the same way is part of the "irreducibility" of collective action.

The core of Searle's thesis is that collective agreement, "enables us to create a reality by representing that reality as existing." The consequence is that the all social and institutional facts share the exact same basic underlying structure. "The key is the imposition of a collectively recognized status." In effect, Searle is arguing that all institutional reality is simply successive re-iterations of the same logical structure as a declaration.

Talk about radical. In time, I believe that Searle's work will be more widely recognized as being revolutionary and foundational for any future social science. Although Searle explicitly states that he is not interested in the topic of how language developed I would like to make an additional point about the importance of monogamy in the formation of language. I have argued elsewhere that language could not have developed out of a simple proto-language, without the level playing-field made possible by agreeing to live monogamously. This idea may not be on anyone's radar, but I believe it has the potential to reframe our entire picture of human nature.