» » Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)
eBook Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) download
History
Author: Stephen L. Melton
ISBN: 0760337136
Subcategory: Military
Pages 320 pages
Publisher Zenith Press; First edition (November 8, 2009)
Language English
Category: History
Rating: 4.9
Votes: 710
ePUB size: 1408 kb
FB2 size: 1593 kb
DJVU size: 1908 kb
Other formats: mobi lrf rtf azw

eBook Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) download

by Stephen L. Melton


The Clausewitz Delusion book. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the . faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Clausewitz Delusion book. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war-which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War-in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great.

The Clausewitz fad of the 1980s and 1990s led the . Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war, which enabled the expansion of American power from the time of the early Indian campaigns all the way through World War II, in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great.

America's war in Afghanistan The military's vacuous new doctrine Organizing for military governance Declaring . C) 2017-2018 All rights are reserved by their owners.

America's war in Afghanistan The military's vacuous new doctrine Organizing for military governance Declaring offensive war: implications for civil-military coordination The frontiers of strategic offense An alternative grand strategy: strategic defense and limited wars The Roman dilemma: why we must choose between republic and empire Offensive war, governance, and empire. On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book.

Stephen L. Melton teaches in the Tactics Department at the . Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). His book joins a number of other recent publications on the reigning philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz, including Jon T. Sumida’s Decoding Clausewitz and Antulio J. Echevarria’s Clausewitz and Contemporary War. Melton’s purpose, though, is not to reinterpret Clausewitz but to use his masterpiece On War as the basis for criticizing the .

This is the central question Stephen Melton seeks to answer in his new book, The Clausewitz Delusion. As a retired Army officer and tactics instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Melton brings more than a little credibility to the issue

This is the central question Stephen Melton seeks to answer in his new book, The Clausewitz Delusion. As a retired Army officer and tactics instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Melton brings more than a little credibility to the issue. He also holds a personal stake in getting the answers right. Along with teaching tactics to the officers who must lead . troops into battle, Melton sent two sons to fight a war in Iraq that he finds mishandled from its very conception.

The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward). The debate about Clausewitz continues. Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009. The author of one book charges and convicts Clausewitz for leading the US Army disastrously astray, whereas the coauthors of the other nd On War still useful, though out of date. Retired from active duty with the US Army, Stephen Melton is currently a faculty member at the US Army’s Com-mand and General Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas.

Stephen Melton, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in. .Bing West and Ray Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division, London 2003, p. 16. oogle Scholar

Stephen Melton, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Minneapolis 2009, p. 11. oogle Scholar. 31. Keith Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution, Cambridge 2010, p. 7. rossRefGoogle Scholar. See Seth Folsom, The Highway War, Washington, DC 2006, p, 235–236. 39. Alistair Finlan, Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror, New York 2014, p.

com: The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (9780760337134): Stephen L. THE CLAUSEWITZ DELUSION: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward. This book demands a wide readership.

The book argues that the army entered the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq lacking a reasonable understanding .

The book argues that the army entered the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq lacking a reasonable understanding of how they would or could be won, as events in both these countries have proven.

book by Stephen L. Melton. Reveals the failings of the US Army in its adoption of the doctrine of 'Full Spectrum Operations' that codified the thinking of Von Clausewitz, whose book On War has been the staple military strategy bible for generations.

In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day.

This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.

Venemarr
This book is the best explanation I've read on the failures of American foreign policy (strategy) and American military policy (tactics without strategy). Melton provides strong evidence and clear reasoning, which is rare.

I'm not saying I agree with Melton 100%. And I'm not saying the book is without flaws. Clausewitz is actually a side issue, more a symptom than a cause of our problems. Melton can be repetitious at times. He ignores China as a potential future enemy. And he's a bit light on how to beat guerrillas and terrorists (which may be because no one knows how to beat guerrillas and terrorists -- not one book I've read makes a credible case on this topic).

But, overall, Melton makes a persuasive case on a critical subject that citizens in a democracy have an obligation to understand.

I wish I could thank the author personally.
Kazijora
The author starts out with a credible case that the type of conflict described by Clausewitz is not pertinent to wars since 1840 or so. Unfortunately, when he gets down to showing his data, he flounders in arm-waving generalities that are not convincing. His attacks on the neo-cons and the Bush Administration are so rabid as to prompt the reader to ignore whatever good ideas he might have had on military government. Save your money for something better; this deserves to be forgotten.
Levaq
I waited months for this book to be released, shipped and delivered - and IT WAS WORTH THE WAIT!! You don't have to agree with Melton's views - but at least you will obtain some honest original thinking that does NOT conform to the tired, old, stale military mantras. As a senior officer of 28+ years, I honestly believe we are at a serious inflection point within the US military. We need to thoroughly re-evaluate our public military doctrines and our strategic perspectives - and even more so, what our hidden paradigms are. Thinking determines behavior - individually as well as institutionally. Melton makes an honest attempt to provide true original thinking in what has become an otherwise droll, redundant military genre of decreasing value due to a severe shortage of originality. I am purposely NOT providing an opinionated regurgitation of Melton's material - you can get that anywhere. Read Melton for yourself - make your own opinions. I am simply claiming that there are precious few original military thinkers out there - and Melton appears to be an honest one. So if you tend to not only read but reflect as well, then I strongly recommend this book to all military "thinkers".
Ramsey`s
I found this book to be very confusing to read. The initial premise seems sound: namely, the U.S. Military, after the Vietnam debacle, lost its way and is now confused as it relies on early 19th century Clausewitzian thinking which does not apply to the U.S. So far, so good, but then the author expands his argument: First, he defines a taxonomy of different kinds of wars and introduces the concepts of Offensive War; Defensive War; and Limited War. He then claims that America has a 300 year long successful streak of winning Offensive Wars that had been stopped by Vietnam. Further he claims that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are also Offensive Wars, but due to the U.S. Army abandoning its traditions due to Vietnam, it is now conducting the war in a wrong way and therefore is losing them - or, at least, not sure how to proceed with them.

These arguments are made in a relatively straightforward way and one can see the internal logic that the author has as he makes his case. The main point is that the U.S. won World War 2 and before because it understood what to do after the battles are over and prepared for it with thousands of troops dedicated to governance after the fighting; and a good method for re-establishing civilian societies once the active warfighting was over. By contrast, during the Iraq war, nobody planned for what to do after the fighting was over and we took over Iraq and consequently we left a huge power vacuum behind; lost the momentum; and were quickly seen as the aggressor occupiers who wanted to take over Iraq and therefore allowed and even encouraged the genesis of the insurgency that we've been fighting ever since.

As long as the author stays on that track, his arguments make sense and his various statistics and historical references and anecdotes contribute to the discussion. Assuming that what he relates about the lack of preparations for the aftermath of the war is correct, then it is a real black eye for the U.S. Army and the whole American government across multiple administrations. The author provides a set of recommendations that he believes will allow the U.S. Army to be better prepared to wage Offensive Wars and win their aftermaths.

Where I think the author loses his thread is in his constant harping about how the U.S. Army lost its way by relying on Clausewitz's writings. He points out that Clausewitz was theorizing about limited wars waged between European monarchies for limited objectives and that the way the U.S. fights its wars is different. But then he muddles that argument by pointing out multiple recent cases where the U.S. Army fought a war for limited objectives and succeeded. Even more confusing was that he states that relying on Clausewitzian thinking lead the U.S. Army astray at the same time that he tells us - repeatedly - that there is no power on earth that can stand and fight against the U.S. Army due to how strong it is and how well it fights. Citing statistics that show that the combat kill rations between the U.S. and its enemies has been 10 to 1 or better for over a century does not align with the argument that the U.S. Army lost its way by reading Clausewitz.

There is a further section that acts as a warning to Americans that the direction in which the military is moving is tending more and more towards becoming a professional force intent on carving out an American empire in the world. Good and thoughtful arguments are presented here with reliance on the historical antecedent of Rome and its fall from Republic to Empire and dissolution due to a similar move by the professional army of its time. This section is very interesting and illuminating, but one has to wonder what that has to do with the rest of the book?

For all these reasons, I find myself rather confused as to what it is that the author is actually trying to achieve? Hodgepodges of ideas - some of which contradict themselves - are thrown together. For these reasons I gave the book only three stars. Nonetheless, there is much in this book that is worth reading, pondering, and understanding.
Ranterl
The author apparently failed to closely read the work he criticizes. If you put Clausewitz in the title, you should be familiar in detail with the work. Melton is not. He completely misunderstands most of Clausewitz's methodology, especially his writings on center of gravity, his definition of politics and the use of the engagement to achieve political objectives. Melton misrepresents Clausewitz's theory and then critiques it. In doing so Melton makes the same mistakes he accuses the American army of making, misapplying theory.